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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(i) (Cum. Supp. 
1994). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Issue. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in 
not further modifying Appellant's alimony award based on 
Appellee's receipt of pension benefits awarded to her in the 
initial divorce decree. 
Standard of Review. The Court of Appeals "review[s] 
both the facts and the law of matters in equity, such as [a] 
request for modification of a divorce decree. Boals v. Boals, 664 
P.2d 1191 (Utah 1983). Nonetheless, [this court] accord[s] 
considerable deference to the judgment of the trial court and 
interpose [s] [its] own judgment only where the evidence clearly 
preponderates to the contrary or the trial court abuses its 
discretion or misapplies principles of law." Jeppson v. Jeppson, 
684 P.2d 69 (Utah 1984); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 668 P.2d 561 (Utah 
1983) . 
2. Issue. Was the District Court's finding that "the 
issue of defendant receiving retirement has not been considered by 
the court in that no evidence was presented to the court in regard 
1 
to the question of whether said retirement was by way of annuity, 
etc. 
Standard of Review. "Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). "The party challenging the 
trial court's factual findings has the heavy burden of 
establishing that those findings are not supported by substantial 
and competent evidence." Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 
1239, 1242 (Utah 1987). To satisfy this burden, "an appellant 
must first marshall all the evidence supporting the finding and 
then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to 
support the findings even in viewing it in the light most 
favorable to the court below." Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 
776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989); accord Cornish Town v. Roller, 758 
P.2d 919, 922 (Utah 1988); Cambelt Int'l, 745 P.2d at 1242. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Determinative law in this appeal is principally case law 
which is provided in the table of authorities and body of this 
brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from a final order modifying the 
parties' divorce decree entered in Third Judicial District Court 
on or about April 14, 1994. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition. 
On or about September 14, 1992, Mrs. Woolsey filed a 
Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce, claiming that the 
alimony award should be modified based on her partial loss of 
income. (R. 101) . Mr. Woolsey filed a Counter Petition to Modify 
Decree of Divorce, claiming the alimony award should be reduced 
based on an increase in income from Mrs. Woolsey's employment and 
the receipt of pension benefits. (R. 175-177) . 
On or about January 25, 1994, a trial was held, at which 
time Mrs. Woolsey withdrew her Petition to Modify. (R. 221, 
Findings of Fact paragraph 9). After trial, the District Court 
found that Mrs. Woolsey7s income had indeed increased and modified 
the alimony award from $500.00 per month to $320.00 per month. (R. 
219-221) . In modifying the Divorce Decree, however, the District 
Court found insufficient evidence regarding Mrs. Woolsey7s receipt 
of retirement benefits to warrant further modification of the 
Decree. (R. 22 0, Findings of Fact paragraph 4). The Order 
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Modifying Decree of Divorce and Judgment was entered by the court 
on or about April 14, 1994. (R. 223). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. and Mrs. Woolsey were divorced on or about 
November 13, 1991. (R. 90-98). 
2. Based on the length of the parties' marriage, Mrs. 
Woolsey's need, her ability to support herself, and Mr. Woolsey's 
ability to pay, the court awarded Mrs. Woolsey permanent alimony 
in the amount of $500.00 per month. (R. 91). 
3. Furthermore, Mrs. Woolsey was awarded one-half of 
all benefits accumulated under the Western Conference of Teamsters 
Pension Plan by Mr. Woolsey from the date of marriage until the 
trial in the matter. (R. 93). 
4. Provided the specific language in the decree 
regarding the distribution of pension benefits, such benefits were 
contemplated in arriving at the alimony award and property 
distribution. (R. 93-97) . 
5. On or about September 14, 1992, Mrs. Woolsey filed 
a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce, claiming that the 
alimony award should be modified based on her partial loss of 
income. (R. 101). 
6. Mr. Woolsey filed a Counter Petition to Modify 
Decree of Divorce, claiming, among other things, that the alimony 
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award should be reduced based on an increase in income from Mrs. 
Woolsey's employment and the receipt of pension benefits. (R. 
175-177) . 
7. On or about January 25, 1994, a trial was held, at 
which time Mrs. Woolsey withdrew her Petition to Modify. (R. 221, 
Findings of Fact paragraph 9). 
8. After trial, the District Court found that Mrs. 
Woolsey's income had indeed increased and modified the alimony 
award from $500.00 per month to $320.00 per month. (R. 219-221). 
9. In those proceedings, the District Court found 
insufficient evidence regarding Mrs. Woolsey's receipt of 
retirement benefits to warrant further modification of alimony. 
(R. 220, Findings of Fact paragraph 4). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In the instant case, the district court, in the original 
divorce proceedings, plainly contemplated Mrs. Woolsey's future 
receipt of retirement benefits. Accordingly, the fulfillment of 
that future income does not constitute a material change in 
circumstances which would warrant further modification of the 
alimony award herein. Accordingly, the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in not considering the retirement benefits 
for such purposes. 
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It is well settled that retirement/pension benefits are 
a marital asset subject to equitable distribution upon 
dissolution. Inasmuch as Mrs. Woolsey was awarded one-half of the 
parties' retirement/pension benefits as part of the property 
distribution in the initial proceedings, the ultimate receipt of 
the same should not serve as the basis for a modification of the 
decree. 
Mr. Woolsey failed to present sufficient evidence at the 
modification proceedings as to the nature of the pension benefits 
and its effect upon those factors considered in determining 
alimony to support further modification of the alimony award. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN NOT FURTHER MODIFYING MRS. WOOLSEY'S 
ALIMONY AWARD BASED ON HER RECEIPT OF PENSION BENEFITS. 
A. Mrs. Woolsey's receipt of pension benefits was 
contemplated at the time of the divorce, therefore, the receipt of 
the same would not constitute grounds for modification. 
A divorce decree will only be modified upon the showing 
of a "substantial change of circumstances subsequent to the 
decree, that was not originally contemplated within the decree 
itself." Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251-52 (Utah App. 1989} 
(emphasis added). Accordingly, "where a future change in 
circumstances is contemplated by the trial court in the divorce 
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decree, the fulfillment of that future change will not constitute 
a material change of circumstances sufficient to modify the 
award." Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah App. 1993).1 
"A change in circumstances reasonably contemplated at the time of 
divorce is not legally cognizable as a substantial change in 
circumstances in modification proceedings." Dana v. Dana, 789 
P.2d 726, 729 (Utah App. 1990); accord Johnson, 855 P.2d at 253. 
In the case at bar, Mrs. Woolsey's receipt of retirement 
benefits was certainly contemplated at the time of the entry of 
the decree in this matter. In fact, over four pages of the decree 
itself were devoted to the specifics regarding time and manner of 
receipt of those retirement benefits. Decree of Divorce attached 
hereto as Addendum "A." Yet, despite the court's obvious 
contemplation of Mrs. Woolsey's receipt of retirement benefits, 
the court also awarded Mrs. Woolsey alimony in the amount of 
$500.00 per month. Accordingly, because Mrs. Woolsey7s ultimate 
receipt of the retirement benefits was contemplated by the court 
The Johnson court further stated that "[w]e do not 
believe it makes for good law or sound policy to have 
parties arguing years after the fact over what a trial 
court may or may not have considered when making an 
alimony award." Johnson, 855 P.2d at 253. In the 
instant case, there is no argument as to whether the 
court considered Mrs. Woolsey's receipt of retirement 
benefits inasmuch as the decree speaks for itself. 
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at the time of the entry of the decree, such cannot be the basis 
for modification herein. 
B. Retirement/pension benefits are marital assets subject to 
equitable division upon dissolution; accordingly, a party's 
ultimate receipt of the same should not be the basis for 
modification of the decree. 
"Retirement benefits accrued during marriage must 
normally be 'considered a marital asset subject to equitable 
distribution upon divorce.'" Burt v. Burt, 799 P. 2d 1166, 1171 
(Utah App. 1990) (citing Motes v. Motes. 786 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah 
App. 1989); accord Greene v. Greene. 751 P.2d 827, 829 (Utah App. 
1988) . 
Just as Mr. Woolsey in the instant action, the Defendant 
in Greene argued that "the portion of the decree which awarded 
plaintiff one-half of defendant's military retirement benefits 
xmay be interpreted only as treating defendant's retirement 
benefits as income[.]'" The court, however, disagreed, stating 
"the military retirement benefits were awarded in addition to 
alimony and child support and were awarded as marital property. . 
. . Therefore, because the court's interpretation of the decree 
is reasonable and consistent with its previous action enforcing 
the $490.00 per month alimony award, we hold that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in finding that the award of military 
retirement benefits in the divorce decree constituted marital 
property." Greene, 751 P.2d at 829. 
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Here, the court, during the modification proceeding, 
acknowledged that it had treated the retirement income as a 
marital asset, even in light of the alimony award. 
[Counsel for Plaintiff]: The reason I submit 
that case is the evidence right there that 
the trial court should consider retirement 
income in adjust [ing] continuing alimony. 
Not only that, but--
[The Court] : Then you would necessarily have 
to adjust what the property division is, 
because this was not treated as income, it 
was treated as property. And I assume I 
treated everyone equally. 
(R. 309). 
This court's decision in Motes v. Motesf 786 P.2d 232 
(Utah App. 1989) is likewise dispositive of the issue at bar. In 
that case, the court ruled that the lower court's postponing 
equitable distribution of husband's retirement benefits for 
purpose of funding increased child support payments to wife was 
error, where the net effect of such approach was to fund husband's 
support obligations through what amounted to apportionment of 
wife's property. Id. at 235. 
In the present case, the Appellant also suggests that 
Mrs. Woolsey be required to fund his support obligations through 
her property distribution. However, pursuant to Motes, Mrs. 
Woolsey should not be compelled to use those funds which were part 
and parcel of the property distribution in lieu of alimony, 
9 
particularly in light of the court's acknowledgement that the 
original property division was fair and equitable. (R. 3 09). 
This is especially true in light of the additional evidence that 
Mrs. Woolsey's expenses still exceeded her income at the time of 
the modification proceeding. (R. 196-198; R. 333-34; Exhibit 24) . 
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in not further modifying the divorce decree and 
reducing Mrs. Woolsey's alimony based on her receipt of retirement 
benefits. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
AT THE MODIFICATION HEARING REGARDING THE 
NATURE OF THE ANNUITY TO WARRANT FURTHER 
MODIFICATION OF THE ALIMONY AWARD. 
Appellant argues that the District Court's finding that 
"there was no evidence presented to the court in regard to the 
question of whether said retirement was by way of annuity, etc. 
was clearly erroneous. A review of the record, however, 
demonstrates that there was not sufficient evidence regarding Mrs. 
Woolsey's receipt of retirement benefits to warrant the court's 
consideration of the same. 
As cited by Appellant, an annuity is defined as "a right 
to receive fixed, periodic payments, either for life or for a term 
of years." Black's Law Dictionary 46 (5th ed. 1983) . While there 
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may have been some evidence relating to the fact that Mrs. Woolsey 
was indeed receiving some periodic retirement benefit, i.e. Mrs. 
Woolsey's financial declaration, there was no evidence before the 
court as to the length or term of the benefit. Mr. Woolsey 
submits that Plaintiff's Exhibit 19 was the sole evidence relating 
to the term of the retirement benefit, however the record from the 
modification proceedings indicates that Plaintiff's Exhibit 19 was 
never offered or admitted. (R. 217) . Accordingly, inasmuch as 
there was no evidence before the court relating to the length or 
term of the benefit, the court could not determine whether such 
was an annuity as defined by Appellant. Therefore, the district 
court's finding regarding the annuity is not clearly erroneous.2 
CONCLUSION 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in not 
further modifying the parties' divorce decree and further reducing 
Mrs. Woolsey's alimony award. Moreover, the district court's 
finding regarding her receipt of the retirement benefits was not 
clearly erroneous. Accordingly, this court should affirm judgment 
of the district court. 
2
 Even were this court to determine that the district 
court's finding was clearly erroneous, such would be 
harmless inasmuch as there was sufficient evidence before 
the court that Mrs. Woolsey's receipt of retirement 
benefits were certainly contemplated at the time of the 
original divorce decree so as to preclude modification on 
that basis. 
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DATED this n day of March, 1995. 
NOLAN J . OLSEN 
A t t o r n e y f o r Defe i4d^nt /Appel lee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the <Q2tncn day of March, 1995, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, 
postage prepaid thereon to: 
Alan R. Stewart, Esquire 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
1366 E. Murray-Holladay Road 
gait Lake City, Utah 84117 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
COPY OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE 
ENTERED NOVEMBER 13, 1991 
DAVID A. McPHIE (2216) 
McPHIE, CONDIE & PECK 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2105 East Murray-Holladay Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
(801) 278-3700 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 1 3 1$ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo— 





DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 904903035 DA 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
-ooOoo— 
The above captioned matter came on for trial at the regularly scheduled time, that being 
on Tuesday, the 1st day of October, 1991 at the hour of 1:30 o'clock p.m. in the Judge 
Murphy's courtroom located at 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The plaintiff appeared in person by and through his attorney of record, Alan R. Stewart. 
The defendant appeared personally and through her attorney of record, David A. McPhie. Prior 
to trial the parties read into the record a stipulation dispositive of many of the issues. The court 
inquired of both parties if they had heard the stipulation read into the record by their respective 
counsel, and if they were willing to be bound by it. Both parties indicated that they had heard 
the stipulation and were so willing. Subsequently, counsel for both parties made opening 
statement and various witnesses, including the parties, were called, examined, cross-examined, 
1 
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f-. f t n p n 
re-examined and re-cross-examined. Counsel for both parties made proffers concerning their 
attorney's fees. Closing arguments were made and the court indicated its intention to announce 
its findings and ruling on the matter on the morning of Thursday, October 3rd, 1991 at the hour 
of 8:15 o'clock a.m. 
The court reconvened in the matter on the morning of Thursday, October 3rd, 1991 at 
the hour of 8:30 o'clock a.m. and then and there announced its Findings of Fact. Having 
previously now published its written Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court now 
makes the following: 
ORDER, JUDGMENT, AND DECREE 
1. Both of the parties, the plaintiff and defendant are each awarded a Decree of 
Divorce, dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the parties, the same 
to become final upon the signing and entry hereof. 
2. The court has previously found that there are no minor children of the parties, 
therefore the court makes no order concerning custody, visitation or child support. 
3. The court awards the defendant alimony in the sum of $500.00 per month 
and orders that the plaintiff pay his said sum each month, and that said alimony be paid in two 
equal installments, one half due on the 5th, and one half due on the 20th of November of 1991, 
and each month thereafter, until such time as said alimony shall be terminated as a matter of 
law. 
4. The defendant is awarded the home and real estate of the parties, located at 8311 
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South 835 East, Sandy, Utah, as her sole and separate property. The plaintiff is ordered to 
execute and deliver to the defendant, a quit claim deed relinquishing to the defendant, except for 
the equitable lien referred to immediately below, all of his right title and interest in said real 
estate, and to sign and deliver said deed as soon as possible subsequent to the entry of this 
Decree of Divorce. The plaintiff is awarded an equitable lien, in and against said home and real 
estate in the amount of $26,431.21, which should be paid to the plaintiff by the defendant upon 
the occurrance of the first of the following three events. 
(1) The defendant remarrys or co-habitats with another adult male to whom 
she is not married; 
(2) At the defendant's death; or 
(3) If the defendant sells the home. 
5. Each of the parties is awarded those items of personal 
property (other then retirement benefits, and insurance proceeds which are mentioned with 
immediately below) to the party in his possessioif they were as of the date of trial in this matter, 
as their sole and separate property, free and clear of any claim of the other party, and subject 
to the debt thereon, if any. Specifically, the plaintiff is awarded the truck and fifth wheel 
trailer, and is obligated to the second mortgage indebtedness on the home and real estate, and 
that he hold the defendant harmless from any liability thereon. An exception to this distribution 
of personal property, is that the items listed on exhibit "A" attached hereto a*^EUEDsa% in the 
possession of the defendant, anfOsbgo^-ha^iirpfid to thg._glaig4.tfE-
6. . The plaintiff is specifically ordered to assume, as his separate debt and obligation, 
and pay any tax obligations or penalties incurred in connection with the withdrawal by him 
3 
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between $6,000.00 and $6,400.00 of moneys from IRA accounts during the pendency of these 
proceedings. 
7* The plaintiff is ordered to cooperate with the defendant for purposes of signing 
any documents, and submitting any paper work necessary to get for and/or deliver to the 
defendant, policies of life insurance, with New York Life Insurance Company. The equity or 
cash value of said policies is hereby awarded to the defendant. This money is awarded to the 
defendant as partial reimbursement of her costs and attorney's fees. 
8. The plaintiff, Dennis W. Woolsey ("Participant") has earned certain benefits under 
the Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Plan (the "Plan") which are the marital property 
of the plaintiff and defendant, ("Alternative Payee") Carol Woosley, and participant. The Court 
awards alternate payee, defendant Carol Woolsey, a 50% percent interest in those benefits as 
set forth below. 
9. The court orders that the alternate payee, Carol Woolsey be awarded 50% OF all 
of the benefits to be paid for the hours of benefit service accumulated by Dennis W: Woolsey 
under the plan, between the date of marriage which was on April 8th, 1960, and the date of trial 
in this matter, which incurred on Tuesday, October 1st, 1991. For purposes of the above 
fraction, hours of benefit service are based on Participants covered hours and years of past 
employment under the Plan. Each year, or fraction thereof, of past employment under the Plan 
shall count as 1,875 hours of benefit service. 
10. Alternate payee shall begin receiving benefits from the Plan in satisfaction of 
alternate payee's fractional interest in participant's retirement benefit on the annuity staring date 
elected by alternate payee subject to the following conditions and limitations: 
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(A) The annuity starting date elected by alternate payee must be the first day 
of a calendar month, must not be before the participant's earliest retirement date (as defined in 
the Plan) and must not be more than three months before alternate payee's application for 
benefits is received by the Plan. 
(B) Alternate payee's annuity starting date must not be later than the effective 
date of participant's retirement benefits. 
(C) Both participant and alternate payee must be alive on alternate payee's 
annuity starting date. 
(D) Alternate payee must file with the Plan an application for the benefits on 
a form prescribed by the Plan. 
(E) Alternate payee must provide the Plan with whatever information the Plan 
reasonably needs to determine alternate payee's entitlement to benefits. 
(F) Participant shall cooperate fully with alternate payee and the Plan to enable 
alternate payee to carry out the conditions of this paragraph. 
11. Once the conditions of paragraph 10 are met, the Plan shall pay the following 
benefits in satisfaction of alternate payee's fractional interest: 
(A) A monthly single-life annuity in the form elected by alternate payee and 
payable to alternate payee on the first day of each month beginning on alternate payee's annuity 
starting date and ending with the last payment due before alternate payee's death. 
(6) A lump sum death benefit equal to the less of (i) 12 times alternate 
payee's monthly annuity under (A) or (ii) the product of alternate payee's fractional interest and 
$10,000, payable upon alternate payee's death to alternate payee's beneficiary. 
5 
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The amount of alternate payee's monthly annuity shall be set by the Plan so that 
the combined single-sum actuarial present value of the monthly annuity and the lump sum death 
benefit as of alternate payee's annuity starting date equals the combined single-sum actuarial 
present value of alternate payee's fractional interest in participant's normal retirement benefit 
under the Plan and alternate payee's fractional interest in any after-retirement lump sum death 
benefit that would have been payable to participant's beneficiary had participant elected to retire 
on alternate payee's annuity starting date. 
12. If a disability retirement benefit first becomes payable to participant before the 
date the participant reaches age 55 and participant and alternate payee both survive to that date, 
then the provisions of paragraph 11 shall be applied to that benefit as if the benefit had become 
effective on the first day of the month beginning on or just following participant's 55th birthday. 
13. The actuarial assumptions that the Plan uses to implement Qualified Domestic 
Relations Orders shall be used to determine actuarial value for purposes of paragraph 12 above. 
14. Unless alternate payee dies before alternate payee's annuity starting date, the 
amount of any retirement befit otherwise payable to participant under the Plan and the amount 
of any benefits that are figured by reference to the amount of participant's retirement benefit 
shall be figured by first reducing participant's total normal retirement benefit by the amount 
obtained by multiplying participant's normal retirement benefit as of alternate payee's annuity 
starting date (or participant's date of death, if earlier) by alternate payee's fractional interest. 
15. If participant dies before alternate payee's annuity starting date, the Plan shall pay 
to alternate payee (or alternate payee's beneficiary if alternate payee predeceases participant) a 
lump sum death benefit equal to the amount obtained by multiplying (A) the lump sum death 
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benefit, if any, payable because of participant's death by (B) alternate payee's fractional interest. 
The balance, if any, of such death benefit remaining after deducting the amount payable to 
alternate payee or alternate payee's beneficiary shall be paid to participant's beneficiary in 
accordance with the terms of the Plan. 
16. If alternate payee survives participant and participant dies before the effective date 
of participant's retirement benefit and before alternate payee's annuity starting date, alternate 
payee shall be treated by the Plan as a "surviving spouse" of participant for purposes of the 
qualified preretirement survivor annuity provisions of the Plan mandated by federal pension law 
(ERISA Section 205(e)), but only to the extent of alternate payee's fractional interest in 
participant's normal retirement benefit. Any qualified preretirement survivor annuity payable 
to any other person because of participant's death shall be figured by first reducing participant's 
normal retirement benefit by alternate payee's fractional interest therein. In no event shall 
alternate payee receive any portion of the qualified joint and survivor annuity payable under the 
Plan pursuant to federal pension law (ERISA Section 205 (e)). 
17. Alternate payee's beneficiary for purposes of any lump sum death benefit payable 
pursuant to paragraph 11 or paragraph 15 shall be all of her then surviving children to equally 
share and share alike.. Alternate payee may change the identify of alternate payee's beneficiary 
at any time by allowing the beneficiary designation procedures in the Plan applicable to Plan 
members. If alternate payee's designated beneficiary predeceases alternate payee, the identity 
of alternate payee's beneficiary shall be determined using the preference beneficiary rules of the 
Plan. 




8311 South 835 East 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
Alternate payee shall keep the Plan advised at all times of alternate payee's current 
current mailing address. If participant applies for a retirement benefit or if a lump sum death 
benefit becomes payable at participant's death before alternate payee's annuity starting date, the 
Plan shall notify alternate payee by first class mail to alternate payee's last address on file with 
the Plan. 
19. Participant's mailing address is: 
Dennis W. Woolsey 
201 Nevada #45 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Participant shall keep the Plan advised at all times of participant's current mailing 
address. 
20. The Court retains jurisdiction to make such further orders as are appropriate to 
enforce or clarify the provisions of paragraphs 8 through 20. 
DATED this  A3 day of '//^^YK UQi^ , 1991. 
THE HONORABLE JtJDGE MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
PERSONAL PROPERTY CLAIMED BY PLAINTIFF 
Truck title 
Backpack 
4-hanger gun rack 
Horseshoe gun rack 
Mantle clock 
Treewood clock 
Metal ammo container with father's possessions in it 
Longhorn steer horns and leather kit 
Elk horns 
Deer horns (unmounted) 
Picture of deer 
Picture of John Wayne 
Arrow made by Doug Wellentine 
Personal hunting picture or negatives 
Old single shot 12 shotgun 
Side racks for pick-up 
Old radio of father's 
Old rusty 10 gal. milkcan 
High school sweater 
Timing light in case 
Tarp 
Old spurs 
Mother's leather purse 
3-burner gas stove 
Coleman lanterns 
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COPY OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
DATED APRIL 14, 1994 
FILED B&7RICTC8&RT 
Third Judicial District 
NOLAN J. OLSEN 
Utah State Bar No. 2464 
OLSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
8138 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: 255-7176 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF- UTAH 
DENNIS W. WOOLSEY, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. : 
CAROL WOOLSEY, : Civil No, 904903035DA 
Defendant. : Honorable Michael R. Murphy 
Plaintiff's and Defendant's Petition to Modify having 
come on to be heard on the 25th day of January, 1994, before the 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, plaintiff appearing in person and by 
his attorney, Alan R. Stewart, and defendant appearing in person 
and by her attorney, Nolan J. Olsen, and plaintiff and defendant 
having presented evidence to the court, and plaintiff having 
testified, and the court having taking said matter under 
advisement, and the court having issued its ruling on the 18th day 
of March, 1994, and the court having been fully advised in the 
premises now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That defendant's income has increased since the time 
of Trial on October 1, 1991, and defendant is now earning 
$1,043.00 per month, an increase of $180.00 per month since the 
time of Trial. 
2. That it is fair and reasonable that the alimony be 
ADDENDUM " B " 
APR 1 4 1994 
Deputy Cterk 
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reduced in the sum of $180.00. 
3. That it is fair and reasonable that commencing in 
April, 1994, plaintiff should be ordered to pay to defendant the 
sum of $320.00 per month as alimony. 
4. That the issue of defendant receiving retirement has 
not been considered by the court in that no evidence was presented 
to the court in regard to the question of whether said retirement 
was by way of annuity, etc. 
5. That plaintiff requested that the home be sold and 
the court finds that there is no substantial change of 
circumstances which would require the sale of said home and the 
request by plaintiff that defendant sell said home should be 
denied. 
6. That plaintiff's Motion to set aside and review the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce 
pursuant to Rule 60b7 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure should be 
granted. 
7. That the Court finds that the Financial Declaration, 
defendant's Exhibit 20, filed by defendant on October 1, 1991, and 
signed by defendant on September 30, 1991, did not set forth the 
savings defendant had at Key Bank, Credit Union IRA, and a Credit 
Union account in the sum of $12,629.48, and plaintiff is entitled 
to one half of said funds in that the court divided all other 
assets equally and had the court been advised of the fact that 
defendant had $12,629.48, plaintiff would have been awarded one 
half of said sum at the time of Trial, and defendant should be 
ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum of $6,314.74. 
8. That it is fair and reasonable that plaintiff and 
defendant should each be ordered to assume and discharge their 
individual court costs and attorney fees with the exception as to 
the expenses and time of plaintiff's attorney and paralegal as to 
the question of the failure of defendant to reveal the funds set 
00220 
forth above and based on the time and expenses in regard to said 
issue, the court finds that defendant should be ordered to pay to 
plaintiff attorney fees in the sum of $520.00. 
9. That prior to Trial, defendant withdrew her Petition 
to Modify. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That plaintiff's request for the sale of the home be 
denied as set forth more fully in the Findings of Fact above. 
2. That alimony be awarded as set forth more "fully in 
the Findings of Fact above. 
3. That plaintiff be awarded a judgment against 
defendant for the sum of $6,314.74 as set forth more fully in the 
Findings of Fact above. 
4. That plaintiff be awarded a judgment against 
defendant for attorney fees in the sum of $520.00 as set forth 
more fully in the Findings of Fact above. 
5. That plaintiff and defendant each assume and 
discharge their individual court costs and attorney fees as set 
forth more fully in the Findings of Fact above. 
6. Defendant's Petition to Modify has been withdrawn and 
dismissed. v 
\*\ day of JS<Wyjk * ^"-19 94. 
BY THE COURT: 
h 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DATED t h i s 
Alan/ft. ^ e w a r t 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 9H day of , j/fhuh 
1994, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS 
OF FACT, to: Alan R. Stewart, Attorney for Plaintiff, 4885 South 




COPY OF THE ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE 
AND JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 60b7 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
DATED APRIL 14, 1994 
NOLAN J. OLSEN 
Utah State Bar No. 2464 
OLSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
8138 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: 255-717 6 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





2 W W l 
)DIFYING DECRE] ORDER MODIFYING DECREE 
OF DIVORCE AND JUDGMENT 
PURSUANT TO RULE 6Ob7 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE ^\°lt^PlO 
Civil No. 904903035DA 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy 
Plaintiff's and Defendant's Petition to Modify having 
come on to be heard on the 25th day of January, 1994, before the 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, plaintiff appearing in person and by 
his attorney, Alan R. Stewart, and defendant appearing in person 
and by her attorney, Nolan J. Olsen, and plaintiff and defendant 
having presented evidence to the court, and plaintiff having 
testified, and the court having taking said matter under 
advisement, and the court having issued its ruling on the 18th day 
of March, 19 94, and the court having heretofore made and entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and upon motion of 
Nolan J. Olsen, attorney for plaintiff, and good cause appearing 
therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. That plaintiff's request for the sale of the home 




2. That the Decree of Divorce in the above entitled 
matter be modified as follows: 
a. That plaintiff be and he is hereby ordered to pay 
to defendant alimony in the sum of $320.00 per month commencing in 
April, 1994, and continuing until defendant remarries, cohabits, 
or plaintiff or defendant die, or until there is other substantial 
change of circumstances as ordered by the court. 
3. That plaintiff be and he is hereby awarded a judgment 
against defendant for the sum of $6,314.74 for monies that were in 
plaintiff's possession at the time of trial which the court was 
unaware of and which were not divided by the court. 
4. That plaintiff be and he is hereby awarded a judgment 
against defendant for attorney fees in the sum of $520.00 for the 
time spent on the issue of the judgment pursuant to paragraph 3. 
5. That plaintiff and defendant be and they are hereby 
each ordered to pay their individual court costs and attorney fees 
on all other matters. 
DATED this 1994. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of K^y n w n 
1994, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE, to: Alan R. Stewart, Attorney for 
Plaintiff, 4885 South 900 East, Suite 306, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84117, postage prepaid thereon. / ) D I 
ML 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ALAN R. CSS'EWART 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
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ADDENDUM "D" 
COPY OF PAGE 00309 TRANSCRIPT OF 
MODIFICATION HEARING 
ALIMONY AWARD. THE COURT OF APPEALS SAID THAT TRIAL 
COURT SHOULD HAVE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION THE FACT THAT 
SHE WAS GOING TO BE RECEIVING THIS PENSION MONEY DOWN THE 
ROAD IN MAKING THE ALIMONY AWARD, WHETHER IT BE PERMANENT 
OR NOT. 
THE REASON I SUBMIT THAT CASE IS THE EVIDENCE 
RIGHT THERE THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD CONSIDER 
RETIREMENT INCOME IN ADJUST CONTINUING ALIMONY. NOT ONLY 
THAT, BUT— 
THE COURT: THEN YOU WOULD NECESSARILY HAVE- TO 
ADJUST WHAT THE PROPERTY DIVISION IS.. BECAUSE THIS WAS 
NOT TREATED AS INCOME, IT WAS TREATED AS PROPERTY. AND 
I ASSUME I TREATED EVERYONE EQUALLY. 
MR. OLSEN: THERE ISN'T ANY QUESTION IN MY 
MIND THAT HAD HE RETIRED, AND THEY WERE BOTH RETIRED, 
THAT'S A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES. THAT WOULD BE A 
APPLICABLE. BUT THAT WOULD CHANGE EVERYTHING. AND THERE 
IS NO QUESTION IN MY MIND THAT THE COURT CAN RULE UPON 
THE REQUIREMENT OF THE DEFENDANT WHO IS FAYING ALIMONY, 
THAT AT THAT TIME THE ALIMONY WILL 3E RECONSIDERED. 
3UT 3ASICALLY THAT IS A DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME. 
IF HE RETIRES AND TAKES HIS INCOME. I'M SURE THAT'S GOINS 
TO BE A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES. 
THE COURT: CAN WE HAVE A STIPULATION ON THAT. 
THAT HER INCOME HAS INCREASED FROM THE TIME OF THE 
ADDENDUM " D " 
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